Abstract Does it make sense to think of eternal life not as an unending continuation of life subsequent to death, but as fully actualized in one's present mortal and finite life? After 
themes that are at least partially constitutive of the idea that eternal life is an exclusively present possession. Third, I point up some intriguing parallels between aspects of the proposed religious conception of eternal life on the one hand and certain implications of the theory known as eternalism in the philosophy of time on the other. Fourth, I canvass four representative objections to the conception of eternal life that emerges from the foregoing considerations, along with possible replies. While I do not presume that these replies resolve all the difficulties that attach to the conception in question, I argue that they assist in showing how this conception can be not only meaningful, but also ethically and spiritually profound.
Against Living Forever
The pressures upon a belief that eternal life consists in living forever are many and varied.
Here I shall highlight a selection of the most important, which have both conceptual and moral dimensions. One of the most significant problems is that any belief in life after death is widely assumed to be at odds with the kind of scientifically informed naturalistic worldview that prevails in many modern societies (cf. Walter 1996) . Although Christians and other religious believers might aspire to reject certain aspects of that worldview, or to find ways of accommodating it within a broader religious perspective, pressure to forego beliefs that conflict with natural scientific theories remains strong. As Paul Badham remarks, 'Many committed Christians suffer "cognitive dissonance" through awareness of how much their faith differs from the secular assumptions that dominate contemporary discussion ' (2013, p. 12) . Accompanying the progress of science has been a 'rebellion against Christian otherworldliness' (Baillie 1934, p. 23) , a rebellion that perceives it as being not only scientifically but also morally misguided to place one's hope in 'eternal joys' beyond this life, which will allegedly reveal our current preoccupations to be mere 'trifling toys ' (cf. Hymn 34, in Watts 1813, p. 168) . Not only has it become impossible under the conditions of modernity to one expects to receive praise from society for doing so; in the latter case, the self-interested nature of the motivation detracts from the moral quality of the action. Similarly, behaving virtuously in the hope that one will be rewarded or avoid punishment after death is likely to be seen by many as morally inferior to behaving virtuously without seeking to gain anything for oneself thereby. Spinoza wrote that 'Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself ' (1996 [1677] , Part 5, prop. 42), and many Christians have concurred that this aptly expresses what is, or ought to be, the motto of Christian ethics (e.g., Main 2013, p. 89) .
Moreover, some would deny that the person who performs certain actions for the sake of possible reward is really acting morally at all; rather, she is behaving merely prudentially or, at best, with mixed motives.
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Even if it is admitted, however, that the promise of unending reward in heaven along with the threat of everlasting damnation in hell have the potential to distort our moral motivations, it might be supposed that the prospect of some after-death experience is necessary if an ostensibly unjust world is to be shown to be just after all-if, that is, a defence of faith is to be mounted against those who would indict God of impotence, dereliction of duty or downright non-existence in the face of the 'problem of evil '. 3 But this supposition may itself be condemned as ushering in a 'shocking theodicy', analogous to the thought that beating or neglecting one's dog is permissible as long as one gives her a bowl of her favourite food later on (Jantzen 1984, p. 40) . Those who cannot, in good faith, bring themselves to attribute such callous calculations to a God of love are apt to insist that, whatever one ends up saying in response to human miseries, the contention that they will all be 'made right' after death cannot be the answer; and, moreover, perhaps one ought to say a lot less and instead do a lot more to alleviate them.
2 Kantian ethics draws an especially sharp line between properly moral and merely prudential motives; for discussion, see Sullivan (1989, pp. 31-43, 122-124) . 3 Well-known theodicies that rely on a conception of after-death experience include those offered in, for example, Hick (1977, esp. ch. 16 ) and Adams (1999, esp. ch. 8) . See also Walls (2002, ch. 5) .
Eternal Life as This Life Only
Many attempts have been made to rebut concerns of the sort just outlined, and to do so while affirming the conception of eternal life as a life infinitely extended in time. 4 My aim here, however, is not to resolve the question of whether the rebuttals are sound; rather, it is to examine an alternative conception of eternal life, which avoids the need for such rebuttals by rejecting the assumption that eternal life must be either the continuation of life without dying or a new life that begins after death. This alternative conception's avoidance of the problems plaguing ideas of living forever contributes towards its philosophical attractiveness. More than that, however, it is a conception of eternal life that, though frequently neglected in philosophy of religion, has remarkable religious and ethical depth. One of the reasons for its neglect is, no doubt, the elusiveness of the forms of language in which it is often articulated, an elusiveness that is often hard to distinguish from indecision or even deliberate obfuscation on the part of exponents. Despite this elusiveness, a number of themes that constitute the conception are discernible in relevant literature. Below I discuss four of these themes in relation to ideas from key theologians and philosophers.
1. One day we shall only have been. The conception of eternal life in question involves an affirmation of the temporal finitude of human life. 'Man as such', writes Karl Barth, 'is finite and mortal. One day he will only have been, as once he was not ' (1960, p. 632) . Similarly, in a radio interview from 1980 Karl Rahner avers that 'with death it's all over. Life is past, and it won't come again. It won't be given one for a second time ' (1986a, p. 238) . From nonreligious spokespeople, such assertions would appear banal; after all, that 'all men are mortal'
is a platitude that has reverberated down through the history of western thought. But it should strike us as far from banal when a theologian declares that 'Death for the Christian is the event in which his or her one and only life is completed' (ibid.). by death or by the passing of time (Rahner 1986b, p. 87) .
It is one
To contemplate eternal life is thus to view one's finite life as though 'under the aspect of eternity' (sub specie aeternitatis), to conceive of it as a completed whole with a determinate place in the history of the universe. For the Christian, this perspective on life brings with it a particular religious and ethical imperative, an imperative to acknowledge the infinite value of life and one's infinite responsibility to live rightly-to live the life of faith and love that one discovers through encounter and fellowship with Christ (cf. Bultmann 1955, p. 38 to say that it has no beginning and no end but that even in its finitude and particularity it is, as finite and particular, eternally an expression of God, a participation in his eternity ' (1979a, pp. 178-179) . Participation, in this sense, is closely connected with the idea of the divinity of love-that insofar as one acts from love, one expresses that which is of God: 'God abides in us and … we abide in him' (1John 4:12-13).
When commentators describe eternal life as a 'quality of existence' (Soards 1991, p. 265) , it is typically this transformed relationship with God through a participation in God's loving nature that they have in mind. 7 Although the Johannine texts frequently speak of knowing God, the form of knowledge at issue is knowledge by acquaintance-the kind of knowledge that consists in intimate relationship-as opposed to mere 'intellectual apprehension' (Guthrie 1981, p. 878 fn.276) , just as faith in God, and in Christ, is more than emotional feeling or speculative assent; 'It is self-renouncing trust, repose of the soul in Jesus Christ' robust and non-heretical way of reading New Testament sources is obliged to give some account of why many scriptural passages appear to look forward to a future time, such as 'the age to come' (e.g., Matthew 12:32; Mark 10:30; Luke 18:30) or 'the last day', when those who believe in God will be raised up 44, 54) . Moreover, such interpreters need to volunteer an explanation of how the Easter hope, that the raising of Jesus from the dead prefigures a more general resurrection, can remain intelligible when the expectation of a life after death is abandoned.
A strategy deployed by Rudolf Bultmann in his reading of the Johannine gospel and epistles is to blame ecclesiastical redactors for interpolating phrases redolent of a 'futuristic eschatology' when the original texts had maintained categorically that it is Jesus' life and ministry alone, with his death as its end, that constitute 'the decisive salvation-event ' (1955, pp. 39, 52) . It could be argued, however, that Bultmann is in this instance being unduly narrow in his appreciation of interpretive possibilities. A suggestion from Phillips reminds us that talk of a 'last judgement' (or of 'the last day') can be construed as offering a means of reflecting on the meaning of one's life as a completed whole. Considered in this light, use of future-tense expressions becomes unsurprising, for one's own death remains always in the future from the subject's point of view (Phillips 1976, p. 144) . 8 Additionally, a comparison can be made with commonplace phrases such as 'at the end of the day' and 'when all is said and done', which in everyday speech do not refer to any specific point in time; rather, they signal a comprehensive verdict on the matter at hand.
Perhaps motivated by a thought analogous to that of Phillips is an approach exhibited by theologians who recommend prepositions such as 'in' and 'through' to replace talk of life after death. As Rahner puts it, 'We must say: through death-not after it-there is (not:
begins to take place) the achieved definitiveness of the freely matured existence of man' (1966, p. 348; cf. 1975, p. 176 to talk of 'in' or 'through'-attempt to capture the depth grammar of the doctrine that our present life alone is the locus of eschatological hope while also doing justice to the momentousness of death, a momentousness so starkly epitomized in Jesus' crucifixion.
What, then, is to be said about the death and resurrection of Jesus from the perspective of an exclusively this-sided, hither-worldly, conception of eternal life? Bultmann, again with
John's Gospel as a principal reference point, maintains that Jesus' resurrection is 'one and the same event' as his return (parousía) and the descent of the Spirit at Pentecost, and that this single event is internal to the life of the believer: it is the arising of 'a faith which recognizes in Jesus the Revelation of God ' (1955, p. 57 ). Lash, too, conceptualizes resurrection in terms of a kind of cognitive discovery or revelation, but supposes the discovery itself to be first instantiated by Jesus, who, 'in dying … discovers that his whole history … far from slipping away … stands, eternally … with the transfigured reality and significance which belong to it from the standpoint of God's eternal light ' (1979a, p. 178) .
Although Lash's attribution to Jesus on the cross of the recognition of the eternal reality of his life dramatizes that recognition in poignant terms, there is no obvious reason for delimiting the dawning of awareness to the final moments of life. We might recall again
Phillips' emphasis on the contemplation of one's life as a completed whole, combining this with Rahner's insistence that death gives a 'definitiveness' to life 'from which you cannot run away ' (1986b, p. 88) . One cannot, on this view, evade one's responsibility for one's decisions-and death, far from enabling one's life to fade away, as it were, into nothingness, fixes it with a determinate reality that, in Lash's evocative phrase, 'stands, eternally'.
Conceptual Augmentation from the Philosophy of Time
By integrating ideas from several theologians and philosophers, the above exposition has given some indication of the conceptual richness of the contention that eternal life is an exclusively present possession. However, notwithstanding talk of contemplating one's life as a completed whole, of participating in God's eternity, and of death's crucial role in supplying life with a determinate reality, many readers, both non-Christian and indeed Christian, are liable to remain bemused by these phrases-hearing in them, perhaps, some semblance of edifying poetry, yet wondering whether they really amount to a conception of eternal life at all. I shall come to some specifically theological and philosophical objections to the conception at issue in the next section. Here, however, I want to suggest that resources for augmenting this conception-for amplifying an aspect of what makes it intelligible as a conception of eternal life-can be found in debates in the philosophy of time, especially in those theories that envisage the universe as a four-dimensional continuum or spacetime manifold.
Some commentators see modern debates over the metaphysics of time prefigured in Presocratic philosophy, with Heraclitus representing the view that, as Plato summarizes it in the Cratylus, everything flows and 'nothing stands fast' (Plato 1997, 401d) and Parmenides typifying the contrasting view that, in truth, everything constitutes an immutable unity and nothing really comes into or goes out of existence (Hoy 2013; Peterson and Silberstein 2010, p. 210) . In modern parlance, the Parmenidean model, or some analogue of it, has come to be known variously as four-dimensionalism, the block universe, or eternalism, and the opposing model, which may or may not have much in common with the thought of Heraclitus, is termed presentism. Typically, presentism is defined as the view that 'only present things exist' (Crisp 2007, p. 90) or 'only the present is real' (Noonan 2013, p. 219) , whereas eternalism is defined as the view that all times, including those that would normally be designated past and future as well as that which is present, are 'equally real' (ibid.). A third view, known as possibilism or the growing block theory, maintains that the past and present are real but the future comprises bare possibilities that are yet to be realized (Callender 2012, p. 73) . My purpose here is not to enter into the tangled debate concerning which, if any, of these theories is nearest the truth. Rather, I want to focus solely on the eternalist model and to explore how it can add conceptual content to the suggestion that our lives, though finite in duration, are nevertheless eternally real. of time. Picturing the temporal sequence as nothing more than the totality of things and events spread out in an 'ordered extension' (Williams 1951, p. 463) , B-theorists affirm that everything within the sequence is 'equally real'; it is this view that is also known as eternalism. B-theorists further contend that the 'flow' of time-the becoming present of events followed by their fading into the past-is not an objective feature of reality but is a mere appearance produced by our own perspective within the continuum. Most eternalists would accept this latter view as well, though there are a few who propose that the equal reality of all times need not preclude the existence of an objective 'now' that moves along the continuum like a spotlight (Skow 2009; cf. Broad 1923, p. 59 ).
Minkowski's model of the universe as a four-dimensional manifold of spacetime coordinates, which takes as its starting point Albert Einstein's theory of special relativity, has much in common with McTaggart's B-series, for it too represents 'all events in the history of the universe' within a single picture while privileging none of them as 'present' (Dieks 2014, pp. 99, 103) . Beyond merely attaching the dimension of time to the three dimensions of space, Minkowski claims that the new model reduces 'space-in-itself and time-in-itself' to mere 'shadows', with 'only a sort of union of the two'-spacetime-'retain[ing] an independent existence' (Minkowski 1918, p. 288) . This vision of reality has been seen as highly conducive to the purposes of those eternalists who, among other things, wish to treat the temporal indexical 'now' in the same way as the spatial indexical 'here', each term identifying merely the location of the subject within the spacetime continuum rather than picking out an objective feature of the universe as a whole.
One might wonder why 'eternalism' has become a popular name for the theory, especially given that the term has an alternative use in philosophical theology to denote the view that God is not in time (see, e.g., Helm 2014 ' (1996, pp. 145-146) . The central thought at work in these claims is something like the following. Once the universe is defined as a fourdimensional whole with time as an intrinsic structural component, the idea that time is something the universe exists in, or persists through, falls away. If, then, the kind of reality possessed by the universe is to be characterized at all, one option is to say that it is eternalnot in the sense that it exists forever, for that would be to imply that it exists temporally (albeit without ever reaching an endpoint), but rather in the sense that it, the universe itself, is the timeless reality, the very context, in which time exists.
Having pictured the universe as an 'eternal manifold' (Williams 1951, p. 470) , a further conceptual step is to think of all the contributory elements of the universe's history as partaking of its eternality. Although, following Spinoza, one might hold that it is the universal whole alone that 'is eternal in its own right' (Hallett 1930, p. 132, original emphasis), this need not preclude its constituent parts possessing a dependent eternity by virtue of their participating, as it were, in the flourishing of the whole. Those constituent parts include our own lives.
Remarkably, it is not unheard of for theoretical physicists as well as metaphysicians to cite the four-dimensional conception of the universe as being decisive in shaping their attitude towards mortality. Einstein in particular, upon hearing of the death of his lifelong friend Michele Besso, wrote to Besso's family that one's 'departure from this strange world' has no significance for 'believing [or "faithful": gläubige] physicists', as 'the distinction between past, present and future amounts to a mere, though obstinate, illusion' (21 March Needless to say, the thought that a human life has a determinate place in the eternal manifold is unlikely to be found consoling by someone who craves to have her deceased beloved with her again or who yearns for an indefinite prolongation of her own life. What it affords instead is an opportunity to adopt an alternative perspective on one's life, or indeed upon the lives of others, a perspective that considers the life as precisely the kind of finite whole that Phillips speaks of or as the 'unity of temporal man', which Rahner describes as being 'given its definitiveness ' by, or through, death (1966, p. 352; 1986b, p. 86) . This unity, says Rahner, may be thought of as the 'resurrection of the dead', not because it is a further life that takes place after the earthly one, but because it is this very earthly life contemplated in its concrete bodiliness (Rahner 1986a, p. 240) . The original life and the resurrected life are not two stages along a single trajectory, as though we merely switched horses and journeyed on (Rahner 1966, p. 347; cf. Feuerbach 1980, p. 19) ; they are the life as lived in time and the life-the same life-as a determinate stretch of the eternal history of the universe. Ultimately one could say that it is neither two stages nor two distinct lives, one mortal and one eternal, that are at issue: it is two perspectives on the same life. As was suggested in the previous section, there is no reason why a transition from one perspective to the other-from the temporal to the eternal-must engender ethical and spiritual revision; but the transition makes possible such revision by prompting reflection upon the values embodied in one's life as a
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See also Einstein's earlier letter of condolence, dated 12 February 1950, to Robert Marcus, whose son had recently died of polio, in which Einstein remarks that human beings are merely limited parts of the whole, which we call 'Universe' (Calaprice 2005, p. 206) . 11 Cf. Le Poidevin (1996, p. 146) : 'And death is no longer the passage into oblivion: it is simply one of the temporal limits of our lives.' whole, and hence upon one's way of living here and now. The Christian is apt to say that if one is prompted, inspired, to surrender one's life to Christ, then the determinate stretch of history that is one's life will be not merely eternally real, but raised in glory, whereas if it abides in wickedness, it condemns itself.
Objections and Replies
Much more could be written on the significance for conceptions of eternal life of the sort of metaphysical eternalism discussed in the preceding section. One could note, for example, the prevalence of something resembling the four-dimensional model of the universe in theological depictions of God's perspective on the world and on our lives; in contrast with us in our ordinary creaturely position in time, it is said that God views everything as 'simply "there" in eternity' (Rogers 2008, p. 181; cf. Helm 2010, pp. 257-259) . I want, however, to leave room for consideration of some objections to the central contention of this article, which is that there is a conception of eternal life as an exclusively present possession that is both intelligible and ethically and spiritually profound. Here I shall adduce four poignant objections and offer at least the outline of a possible reply to each in turn.
1. Watering down Christianity. The philosopher H. H. Price, commenting on the proposal that 'Eternal life is just life of the highest possible quality' and 'has no temporal implications at all', has suggested that this is merely 'a watered-down version of Christianity ' (1972, pp. 92-93, 94) , which is recommended only by those who make the 'psychological mistake' of assuming 'that it is easier to accept a simple creed than a complex one' (p. 94). There are two points to be addressed here, one concerning dilution and the other concerning ease of acceptance. With regard to the first, the idea that eternal life is, or can be, a quality of one's finite and mortal life amounts to a dilution or watering down of the Christian message only if one overlooks the ethical, psychological and existential depth that the idea evinces. The quality of existence that believers are enjoined to take on is a life-transforming one, a reorientation of values away from self-gratification and towards love of neighbour and of enemy alike. It is a quality of existence so demanding that believers admit to being unable to carry it through without the grace of God, and yet the rewards internal to that quality of existence are such that believers speak of the victory over death-freedom from the shadow that death casts-coming from the relinquishing of self-serving goals. If the injunction to transform one's life in this way constitutes a mere dilution of the gospel, then it is unclear what would count as the gospel's consolidation.
With regard to whether 'it is easier to accept a simple creed than a complex one', it is obvious neither that conceiving of eternal life as a present possession is 'a simple creed' nor that Christianity has much to do with ease of acceptance in any case. The idea that eternal life, rather than being an unendingly prolonged life beyond death, is the present life qualitatively transformed is likely to be viewed as simple only if the severe demandingness of the qualitative transformation is ignored. Moreover, while the principle that one must change one's life might be relatively easy to accept, the change itself may well be infinitely difficult to achieve, which is why faith is frequently recognized to be more than a merely intellectual assent to a doctrinal claim; it is, as Søren Kierkegaard among many others has insisted, never a completed act, but 'a passion that must be constantly renewed' (McDonald 2014, p. 69; cf.
Kierkegaard 1992, p. 204).
2. We drop out of the picture. Responding to ideas from Nicholas Lash in particular, Brian Hebblethwaite has argued that Lash advocates a vision of eternal life in which wehuman individuals-'slip out' or 'drop out of the picture', leaving not us with an eternal life at all, but only our ordinary lives experienced, as Lash puts it, 'from the standpoint of God' (Hebblethwaite 1979, p. 60; cf. Lash 1979a, p. 178) . A similar complaint was made earlier by John Baillie against those who conceive of immortality as a reabsorption 'into the divine life' as opposed to individual continuation. 'Of course,' writes Baillie (1934, p. 189), if what is meant is simply that I cease to be, whereas God remains, no strain at all is then put upon my powers of believing, because there is really nothing regarding myself that I am asked to believe. But if more than this is implied, to what exactly does it amount?
Replying to Hebblethwaite's objection, Lash contends that if it were the case that we had slipped 'out of the picture', then 'God's timeless life would have been deprived of contingent, temporal expression' (1979b, p. 63), Lash's point being that viewing one's present, historically embedded, life as the one that is eternal insofar as it expresses the glory of God is hardly to eliminate human beings from the picture. What has been eliminated is the possibility of our undergoing fresh experiences subsequent to death, for this has been replaced by a renewed emphasis on our participation in God's eternity here and now. Against those who suppose that a vision of this kind is comparable to the one that Baillie dismisses as presenting nothing in which to believe regarding oneself, it could be observed that coming to accept the life of Jesus as the revelation of God's reality, a reality that demands of us an ongoing commitment to self-sacrificing love, is far indeed from nothing. 3. Eternal life must be more than a perspective. A further objection might pick up on the perspectival theme-the idea that eternal life is not more life but one's present life viewed under a different aspect-and maintain that receiving eternal life has to amount to more than a mere change of perspective: it must involve a change in one's life itself. An objection of 12 As a reviewer for this journal pertinently observes, a full account of how a human life can be said to be finite in duration and yet also to express, and thereby indwell, the eternal life of God would require more detailed discussion of the concept of God than I have had space to provide here. Such discussion would have to address, in particular, the question of what it means for God to be love and for a human being's loving activity to participate in God's reality. I make some suggestions relevant to these issues in Burley (2014, pp. 322-324) , though I admit that further explicatory work is needed.
this sort might be linked with the criticism-often made of D. Z. Phillips, for example-that what is being offered is a 'non-realist' account, an account concerning only human attitudes to life and having little bearing upon any 'facts' that exist independently of the forms of religious discourse in which the attitudes are expressed. 13 A reply to this objection could begin by questioning the supposed distinction between a transformed perspective or attitude on the one hand and a transformed life on the other. A change in the way one sees and thinks about one's life, it might be noted, is itself a change in one's life. In other words, to come to notice something about one's life of which one had previously been unaware is not for one's life to remain unchanged: it is, precisely, to be changed with respect to one's self-conception, which can, in certain instances, be the greatest transformation anyone can undergo. It can, indeed, be nothing less than a conversion, revealing not only one's life, but also the world, anew (cf. Lonergan 1973, pp. 130-131) .
The considerations from theoretical physics and the philosophy of time facilitate a further reply, which is that there is indeed a sense in which the eternality of our lives consists in more than a change of perspective; the change of perspective identifies an independently real characteristic of our lives, the fact that their reality does not diminish with the passing of time. What the Christian viewpoint infuses into this picture is an emphasis on its being specifically the ethical reality of one's life that cannot be diminished and a vision of what ethical life ought to be.
4. Facing up to evil. Finally, the most powerful of the objections that I shall consider here is one that accuses the conception of eternal life under discussion of not merely failing to address the problem of evil, but of compounding that problem by envisaging eternity as a static condition in which all human acts and experiences, including the most heinous crimes and most pitiable sufferings, remain fixed and unalterable. Physical and metaphysical theories of time of the sort discussed in this article have been known to encourage the thought that the universe, and everything that composes it, is immutable by describing it as a block that is, in effect, 'static'. As several commentators have pointed out, the latter notion 'is rather misleading … as it suggests that there is a time frame in which the four-dimensional block universe stays the same' (Huw Price 1996, p. 13); yet expositions of the fourdimensional view frequently rely on images such as that of a 'frozen river' (Greene 2005, ch. 5) or 'sea of ice' (Le Poidevin 1996, p. 138) to represent, albeit metaphorically, 'the whole of history at once, in one picture' (Dieks 2014, p. 103 The conception of eternal life as an exclusively present possession offers no second chance, but maintains that it is the tragic lives themselves that are eternally real; the tragedy cannot be assuaged, still less 'defeated', by any 'incommensurate Good' granted after death. 14 As Grace Jantzen observes, when Jesus says that even the sparrows that fall to the ground do not go unnoticed by God, he 'never denies that sparrows do fall ' (1984, p. 42; cf. Matthew 10:29) .
Humans, too, fall, and are sometimes crushed by the world. Understanding those lives in the light of the doctrine that God is love cannot undo their suffering. But it might, for some believers, open up the possibility of seeing how, in their eternal reality, even-or perhaps especially-the lives of the most downtrodden are 'raised on high' (Phillips 2004, p. 273) .
Concluding Remarks
I have argued in this article for the intelligibility of a conception of eternal life according to which it is the finite life that one presently possesses-and not some future existence-which is, in a certain sense, eternal. I have also proposed that, beyond mere intelligibility, the conception of eternal life at issue has ethical and spiritual depth. This latter proposal is not 14 For discussion of 'incommensurate goodness' and the 'defeat' of 'even horrendous evils', see Adams (1999, pp. 4, 82-85, 162-163 et passim) .
intended as the claim that anyone ought to become a believer in eternal life in the sense concerned; nor is it a confession of faith on my own part. Rather, it is the contention that the conception under discussion deserves to be taken seriously as a religious possibility, instead of being written off as somehow falling short of genuine religion or as lacking metaphysical or ethical significance. others will insist that it is only a conception of this kind that is able to avoid the conceptual and moral difficulties associated with belief in a life subsequent to the present one.
The observation of intriguing parallels between models of the universe in theoretical physics and the philosophy of time on the one hand and in theology on the other is far from unique to me. Several commentators have pointed out resemblances between the theological depictions of the world as God apprehends it and philosophical and scientific theories of space and time as a unified continuum comprising the entire history of the universe (e.g., Helm 2010, ch. 14; Chase 2014) . Although there remains considerable scope for further exploration of these resemblances, I hope to have advanced the discussion by focusing particular attention upon the theme of the eternal reality of our finite and mortal lives.
It is often assumed that rejecting the idea of eternal life as an other-worldly existence must be part of a secularizing strategy, which seeks to 'confine' the significance of religion to 'this world' alone (Badham 1989, p. 27 ). This assumption underestimates how variegated are the ways in which 'this world', and the lives that we live in it, can themselves be comprehended in religious terms. Understanding eternal life as an exclusively present possession, in the sense, or senses, explored in this article, is not a matter of relinquishing a religious view of the world in favour of one denuded of religious meaning. It is, on the contrary, to view one's one-and-only life under the aspect of eternity, to perceive it as an inestimably precious gift, the opportunity to participate in the world as an expression of the eternal life of God.
